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Although the stated purpose of Physics viii 8 is to prove that only circular loco-
motion is infinitely continuous, it is generally recognized that a major sub-theme
of the chapter has to do with the unity of change and centers on Zeno’s
dichotomy paradox. According to one influential account of this sub-theme,
Aristotle returns to the dichotomy paradox in Physics viii 8, primarily to engage
in a defensive maneuver. In Physics vi, while focused on the infinite divisibility
of change instead of its identity conditions, Aristotle left open the possibility that
occurrences that are ‘one change’ could have infinitely many parts that are also
‘one change’.1 By Physics viii 8, however, Zeno has brought Aristotle to realize
that if this possibility is admitted, then what one chooses to call ‘one change’ is to
a large extent arbitrary. But this Aristotle cannot countenance, because his entire
theory of change is built upon the concept of a change as a thing uniquely defin-
able as the passage from a particular state to a particular state. In Physics viii 8,
then, Aristotle seeks to avoid this result by ‘refining’ the definition of ‘one
change’ so that ‘one change’ can no longer have parts that are also ‘one change’
and by invoking the metaphysical machinery of the act-potency distinction to
give a positive characterization of the difference between change parts and
change wholes.2
According to Michael White, Aristotle ‘refines’ his definition of ‘one change’
in Physics viii 8 by strengthening the criteria of Physics v 4; criteria, which,
White is correct to point out, do nothing to prevent this result on their own.3
According to White, this ‘refinement’ consists in adding, to the criteria of
Physics v 4 (i.e., the criteria that ‘one change’ must be in a continuous time, have
a single subject throughout, and proceed throughout from a terminus of the same
species to a contrary terminus of the same species), the additional condition that
an occurrence that is ‘one change’ must be bracketed by periods of rest and con-
tain no periods of rest. This condition is never stated as such in Physics viii 8, but
it can be inferred from the doctrine, explicitly invoked in Aristotle’s discussion
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1 For instance, at Physics vi 6.237a18-19, Aristotle says  µ   µ 
µ,    µ  µ , which seems to
count change parts as changes themselves. 
2 This, interpretation is originally due to Broadie 1982, 131-158, but was later taken up and elab-
orated by White 1992, 102-6. 
3 White 1992, 105. Since this is a point that Broadie 1982, 151 misses, I shall focus primarily on
White’s account as the most viable version of the interpretation I am now discussing.
of the dichotomy paradox at 263a4-b8 and proved earlier at 262a17-b8, that if a
moving thing uses a state as the end of one change and the beginning of another,
it must come to rest in that state.
There is general agreement, however, that the proof of this doctrine at 262a17-
b8 is marred by a serious and puzzling philosophical mistake,4 since Aristotle
seems to imply that there can be a first instant of having departed from a given
state in the course of continuous change. If this is indeed a mistake, it is a serious
one because it undermines Aristotle’s response to Zeno, and, therefore, under-
mines Aristotle’s entire theory of change. For if Aristotle has not, in fact, proved
that what one chooses to call ‘one change’ cannot be entirely arbitrary, then Zeno
is free to deny any sense to the concept of a change as a thing uniquely definable
as the passage from a particular state to a particular state. This mistake is puz-
zling because it seems to betray confusion regarding a matter that Aristotle was
quite clear about in Physics vi 5, viz., that there is no first instant of having
departed from a given state in the course of continuous change. 
I believe that if one feels puzzlement, here, it should be taken as a strong indi-
cation that one does not fully understand Aristotle’s argument. Even if it is con-
ceded that Aristotle can sometimes make obvious mistakes, it cannot be
supposed that he assumes a claim in Physics viii 8 that he cogently and thor-
oughly refutes in a text that was, by all accounts, written earlier. I will demon-
strate that the argument at 262a17-b8 has, indeed, been misunderstood because
insufficient attention has been paid to the fact that it is a reductio ad absurdum,
and that the absurdities it produces derive from an infinite fracturing of change.
Now, of course, the infinite fracturing of change is precisely what Aristotle wants
to avoid. The idea of this argument, however, seems to be that if we grant an
assumption that implies this infinite fracturing of change, and logical contradic-
tions can, in turn, be derived from it, then we are entitled to infer the contradic-
tory of the assumption in question, i.e., to infer that what one chooses to call ‘one
change’ cannot be entirely arbitrary, as well as to infer the impossibility of the
infinite fracturing of change that follows from it. I will argue that not only the
reductio argument at 262a17-b8 (let us call this ‘reductio (a)’), but also three
other reductio arguments in Physics viii 8 can be interpreted as granting this
assumption for the purpose of refuting it, even though this assumption, and the
infinite fracturing of change it entails, is not explicitly stated in these other argu-
ments: the indirect proof at 262b22-263a3 of the claim that a reversal in the
direction of a rectilinear locomotion requires the moving thing to come to rest
(‘reductio (b)’), the indirect proof at 263b26-264a4 of the claim that the time of a
change cannot be divided into indivisibles (‘reductio (c)’), and finally, the indi-
rect proof at 264b1-6 of the claim that a reversal in the direction of an alteration
requires the moving thing to come to rest (‘reductio (d)’). 
Thus, I will argue that while an infinite fracturing of change is on the face of
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4 See Sorabji 1976, 174; White 1992, 54-58. Cf. Bostock 1972, 42, and Charlton 1995, 139 that
also claim that Aristotle made a mistake here.
reductio (a), it can be plausibly and profitably read into reductios (b)-(d) as well;
plausibly because of close structural similarities that these arguments bear to
reductio (a); profitably because doing so gives us a unified way to understand
these arguments that is a better textual fit than taking them to be fixing Aristo-
tle’s criteria for the unity of change. I say this, in part, because the textual case
for the latter interpretation is weak. The only explicit mention of criteria for the
unity of change in Physics viii 8 is in another indirect proof, distinct from the
ones that I have mentioned, of the same proposition proved in reductio (b), but
that proceeds by an entirely different line of argument that involves no infinite
fracturing of change and, therefore, seems to have nothing to do with Zeno’s
dichotomy paradox. I will analyze this argument (‘reductio (e)’), to show how
criteria for the unity of change do enter into the arguments of Physics viii 8, but it
will be a different role from the one suggested by Broadie and White.
Reductio (a)
The key elements of Aristotle’s explicit response to Zeno at 263a4-b8 are the
claims that the parts of a change exist potentially, and not actually, that change
parts exist actually only if their limits exist actually, and these exist actually only
if they mark off kinetic discontinuities. As Aristotle puts it, the limits of a change
exist actually when the moving thing uses a state as the end of one change and
the beginning of another, and at 263a22-23 he invokes the result of his ‘previous
discussion’ that using a state in this way creates a discontinuity. By the ‘previous
discussion’, he clearly means reductio (a), where this result is first proved. Thus,
while reductio (a) ultimately plays a role in establishing that only circular motion
is infinitely continuous, the back-reference to it at 263a22-23 suggests that it also
supplies a key premise used to address Zeno’s dichotomy paradox. The core of
reductio (a) is in the following passage:
A is in locomotion and comes to a stop at B and again under-
goes locomotion towards C. But when it undergoes locomotion
continuously, A can neither have come to be at point B nor
have departed <from it>, but it can only be there at an instant,
not in any time interval, except that of which the instant is a
dividing point, (a30) namely, the whole time interval. (If any-
one will suppose that it has come to be there and has departed,
A will always be coming to a stop when it is undergoing loco-
motion, for (262b1) A cannot have come to be at B and have
departed at the same time. Therefore <it must have done so> at
a different point of time. Therefore what is in between will be a
time interval. And so, A will be at rest at B. And likewise at the
other points too, since the same argument holds for them all.
(b5) But when A, the thing undergoing locomotion, uses B, the
middle, as both an end and a beginning, A must stop because it
makes <the point> two, just as if one were to do so in thought.)
But it has departed from point A as its starting point and has
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come to be at C when it finishes <its motion> and
stops.5 (Physics viii 8.262a26-b8)
The reductio argument, here, can be paraphrased as follows: Assume that (1) an
object A moves continuously (262a28) from point E to point C along a spatial
path containing the point B.6 Assume, for reductio ad absurdum, that (2) A has
come to be at point B and has departed from point B, but does not rest at point B.
From this, somehow infer that (3) A is always coming to a stop when it is under-
going locomotion and somehow infer that (4) A has come to be at point B and
has departed from point B at the same time. From the impossibility of (4) A hav-
ing come to be at point B and having departed from point B at the same time,
infer that (5) A has come to be at point B and has departed from point B at differ-
ent times. From this, infer that (6) there is a time interval between when A has
come to be at point B and when A has departed from point B. From this, infer
that (7) A rests at point B, which contradicts the initial assumption (2) that A
does not rest at point B. So infer the negation of the initial assumption [i.e., (2)],
viz., (8) if A has come to be at point B and has departed from point B, it rests at
point B. Q.E.D.
Richard Sorabji and Michael White have correctly pointed out that in order to
infer directly from proposition (6) to proposition (7), one needs to assume that
there is a first instant of having departed from point B (see n4, above). But Aris-
totle is quite clear in Physics vi 5.236a7ff. that in a continuous change, there is no
first instant of having changed, and since having departed follows upon having
changed (235b6ff.), then there is no first instant of having departed. So according
to Physics vi 5, there is, indeed, a time interval between the instant when A has
come to be at point B and every instant when A has departed from point B, but
since every instant of having departed from point B is preceded by another
instant of having departed from point B, it does not follow that A ever rests at
point B. So Aristotle appears to have made a mistake, and fairly obvious one that
he should have known better than to make.
I will establish, in due course, that there is no mistake, here,7 but for the
moment I would like to point out two things: First, since this argument is a reduc-
tio ad absurdum, one need not attribute all of its premises to Aristotle, because,
inevitably, some of them will be adopted dialectically, for purpose of refutation.
Second, propositions (5), (6), and (7) are logically otiose, since, once Aristotle
has inferred proposition (4), which implies that A is both at B and away from B at
the same time, he could have inferred from the impossibility of this directly to the
conclusion (8), which is the contradictory of (2), the proposition that is supposed
to have generated this impossibility. It was, therefore, not necessary for Aristotle
322
5 The translations of Aristotle’s Physics viii 8 as well as the commentary by Simplicius on this
chapter are, with minor modifications, from McKirahan 2001. Unless otherwise noted, other transla-
tions of Aristotle are from Barnes 1995.
6 The origin is not named, but it is convenient to call it ‘point E’.
7 And for this reason, I will not consider the ingenious attempts of White 1992, 54-58 to make
Aristotle’s ‘mistake’ out to be more subtle than it appears to be.
to infer directly from proposition (6) to proposition (7). From this, it follows
either that Aristotle’s ‘mistake’, as some have interpreted it, was sadly unneces-
sary, or that he had other reasons for assuming that there is a first instant when A
has departed from point B. I will argue for the latter interpretation.
Little attention has been given by commentators to proposition (3), the claim,
which Aristotle arrears to derive from proposition (2), that A ‘will always be
coming to a stop when it is undergoing locomotion’. This is a pity, I think,
because it is the key to understanding reductios (a)-(d). What this proposition
amounts to can be deduced as follows: The claim that A ‘will always be coming
to a stop when it is undergoing locomotion’ apparently means that A will be
coming to a stop at every now within the period of its motion. Since, to every
now within the period of a locomotion, there corresponds a spatial point in the
locomotion’s path,8 the claim that A will be coming to a stop at every now within
the period of its motion also means that A will be coming to a stop at every spa-
tial point along the locomotion’s path. The point of the preamble to reductio (a)
at 262a19-26 seems to be that A comes to a stop at point B and then moves on
just in case it uses point B as the destination of one motion and the origin of
another that follows it. Always coming to a stop in the course of a locomotion,
then, amounts to using each of the infinitely many positions along the path of the
motion as the destination of one motion and the origin of another that follows it.
If A does this, however, the locomotion that we have implicitly assumed to be
one must be viewed as many, and, indeed, infinitely many. For A to be always
coming to a stop while it is undergoing locomotion, then, is for A to be undergo-
ing infinitely many locomotions; as many locomotions as there are points along
the motion’s path. Aristotle’s claim, then, is that if we allow that A can come to
be at and depart from point B without resting, then A’s motion will be divided at
every stage.
But how does it follow from the fact that A uses point B as the destination of
one motion and the origin of another without resting, that A must do so at every
point along its path? Simplicius, In Phys. 1283,17 suggests that since B is an
arbitrarily selected point along A’s path, then there is no reason why the same
result should not follow for any other point along the path. While true enough,
this observation only gets us the result that A can use any point as the destination
of one motion and the origin of another without resting, not that A can do so at
every point, much less that it must do so at every point. Aristotle’s rationale, I
suspect, is that since A’s motion is assumed to be continuous (262a28), i.e., since
there are no pauses, breaks in the path of the change, changes in direction, or
changes of subject, if A is allowed to use point B as the destination of one motion
and the origin of another without resting, then there is no basis for maintaining a
distinction between using a point as the boundary of successive motions and
merely passing through it. And if this is the case, since A is obliged to pass
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8 See Physics vi 2, as well as Aristotle’s claim, in Physics iv 11, that ‘time follows change’ and
that ‘change follows magnitude’, since, as this is most often interpreted, this implies a one-one corre-
spondence between the punctual elements in each of these continua.
through all of the points on the path of its journey, then A is also obliged to use
each of these points as a terminus. If the example had envisaged A resting at
point B, or another subject D taking over at point B, as in a relay race, so that the
subject is not the same, or the motion changing direction at point B, one could
adduce these features of A’s motion as reasons for treating point B as a kinetic
terminus in preference to other points along A’s path. But if these things are ruled
out ex hypothesi, and one still insists that point B is the boundary of successive
motions, there is no reason not to view every point that A traverses as the bound-
ary of successive motions. Thus, the Zenonian assumption, implicit in the
dichotomy paradox, that what one chooses to call ‘one change’ is entirely arbi-
trary, leads, in the case of a continuous motion, to the result that the motion is
divided at every stage.
In the light of this, the otherwise puzzling puzzle that immediately follows
reductio (a) becomes readily intelligible:
Therefore this is the response that should be given to the puzzle
as well. For there is the following puzzle: (b10) if line E is
equal to line F and A undergoes locomotion continuously from
the extremity towards C, and if A is at point B at the same time
as D is undergoing locomotion from the extremity F towards G
uniformly and with the same speed as A, then D will have
come to G before A does to C. For what sets out and departs
(b15) earlier must arrive earlier. Therefore A has not come to
be at B and departed from it at the same time, which is why it is
delayed. For if <it has come to be and departed> at the same
time, it will not be delayed, but <if this is to happen> it will
have to come to a stop. Therefore we must not suppose that
when A came to be at B, D was simultaneously moving from
the extremity F (for if A will have come to be at B, (b20) its
departure will also occur, but not at the same time); rather, it
was there at a cut of time and not in a time interval. (Physics
viii 8.262b8-22)
The puzzle envisages two motions by subjects A and D that are perfectly analo-
gous (i.e., both are continuous, are over the same distance, and have the same
speed, etc.) except that A is said to pass through a mid-point B on its way to its
destination. And assuming that using a point as the boundary of successive
motions is the same as merely passing through it, the poser of the puzzle purports
to convict Aristotle of a philosophical howler by attributing to him the view that
by merely passing through point B, A will arrive at its destination later than D
arrives at its destination, even though their motions are otherwise perfectly anal-
ogous. But, according to Aristotle, it is not merely passing through point B that
delays A’s passage, but coming to be at point B and departing from point B, so
either A merely passes through point B, in which case, the delay (and the absur-
dity) does not result, or A comes to be at point B and then departs from point B,
and, therefore must rest, in which case the two motions are not perfectly analo-
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gous because one is continuous while the other is not.9 Hence, the solution of the
puzzle consists in the alleged fact that if using a point as the boundary of succes-
sive motions is not the same as merely passing through it, then if a moving thing
uses a point as the boundary of successive motions, the motion it undergoes must
be discontinuous.10 Aristotle’s solution to Zeno’s dichotomy paradox is exactly
analogous, insofar as he argues that since there is a difference between using a
point as the boundary of successive motions and merely passing through it, then a
motion that uses a point as the boundary of successive motions must be discon-
tinuous at that point (263a4-b8). It is implicit in Zeno’s paradox, as well as in the
present puzzle, that there is no such difference, and indeed, we might be sympa-
thetic with such a denial, since, indeed, a distinction between coming to be at
point B and departing from point B without resting and merely passing through
point B seems, at first sight, like a distinction without a difference. But then Aris-
totle will claim that what we take to be continuous, and intuitively unified
motions must really be divided at every stage, and this, ultimately, will have
unacceptable consequences.
This is because, if intuitively unified motions must really be divided at every
stage, then, according to Aristotle, we are entitled to make certain inferences
about what the motion, the time of the motion, and the path of the motion are
divisible into and composed of. Aristotle argues at Physics vi 1.232a18-22 that
any division of a continuous locomotion will also divide the time of the motion
as well as the path. And it is clear from the arguments in Physics vi 2 that in such
a division, each of these continua will be divided at corresponding points, so that
the division of a continuous locomotion at every stage entails the division of the
path of the motion at every point as well as the time of the motion at every now.11
In Generation and Corruption i 2 Aristotle concedes to the atomists that if a
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9 Aristotle says ‘we must not hold that when A came to be at B [or was at B], D was at the same
time in motion from the extremity of F’. Rather, we would need to say either that A was at point B but
did not come to be at point B, or that D paused while A was at rest at point B for the motions to cor-
respond to one another in all respects (i.e., to have the same distance and same speed) except for the
fact that A passes through point B.
10 This is the contrapositive of the claim just invoked to justify the inference from the fact that a
moving thing undergoes a continuous motion and uses a point along its path as the boundary of suc-
cessive motions, to the fact that it must do so at every point along its path, i.e., the claim that if the
antecedent of this conditional is satisfied, then using a point as the boundary of successive motions is
the same as merely passing through it. Aristotle argues that since the consequent is false, then the
antecedent is impossible. Thus, Simplicius claims that Aristotle ‘brings up a puzzle that is directed
against [the view that if A comes to be and departs from B, it must rest at B] and he solves the puzzle
by making determinate what was assumed indeterminately in it’ (In Phys. 1284,21-2) i.e., the false
claim ‘that what is at something also comes to be at it and departs <from it>’ (In Phys. 1285,10),
which I take to be tantamount to the claim that using a point as the boundary of successive motions is
that same as merely passing through it. (Simplicius suggests that this is assumed for A but not for D,
but Aristotle does not name a point on F-G that corresponds to point B that is only occupied ‘at a cut’.
Rather, this claim is left out of the account entirely, and I think this is the point of the objection, viz.,
that merely naming point B on path E-C could not plausibly slow down A in its transit of this line.)
11 This will also follow from Aristotle’s claim, in Physics iv 11, that ‘time follows change’ and
that ‘change follows magnitude’. See n8 above.
magnitude were divided everywhere, it would be divided into points. The ratio-
nale given is that if a magnitude were divided everywhere, then when the divi-
sion is finished only indivisibles could be left since divisibles would contain
places that are still undivided (316a23ff.). If we assume that Aristotle is making a
similar dialectical concession in Physics vi 1 and viii 8, then the division of the
locomotion at every stage, the path of the locomotion at every point, and the time
of the locomotion at every now, will divide the locomotion into instantaneous
motions (µ, as Aristotle calls them), the path of the locomotion into
points, and the time of the locomotion into nows. And since, as Aristotle says at
Physics vi 1.231b10-11, each continuum ‘is divisible into the parts of which it is
composed’, if a locomotion were divided at every stage, the locomotion itself
would be composed of µ, the path of the motion would be composed of
points, and the time of the locomotion would be composed of nows.
This, I believe, gives us a new way to understand reductio (a) since, if the fore-
going is true, then there is a fairly straightforward route to the disjunctive conclu-
sion that either there is a first instant of having left point B, or A has come to be
at point B and has left point B at the same time. And if it ultimately follows from
the assumption (which Aristotle adopts for the purpose of refutation in reductio
(a)) that A can come to be at and depart from point B without resting, that there is
a first instant of having left point B, we need not suppose that Aristotle has for-
gotten his arguments in Physics vi 5 that this is impossible.
In Physics vi 1 Aristotle refutes the claim that a continuum can be composed of
indivisibles by assuming that the components of a continuum can stand in only
three relations, viz., being continuous with each other, being contiguous with
each other, and being successive, and arguing that indivisibles can stand in none
of these relations.12 He invokes the definitions of Physics v 3 for these terms: two
things are successive if and only if one follows the other in sequence and there is
nothing of the same kind in between, two things are contiguous with each other if
an only if they are successive and in contact (i.e., have limits that coincide), and
two things are continuous with each other if and only if they are contiguous with
each other and their limits that coincide are one. So if a continuum were com-
posed of indivisibles, Aristotle argues, then these indivisibles would need to be
either continuous with each other, contiguous with each other, or successive. A
continuum cannot be composed of indivisibles that are continuous with each
other because indivisibles have no limits distinct from any other part of them to
form a unity (231a24-7). So if a continuum were composed of indivisibles, these
indivisibles would need to be either successive or contiguous with each other. If a
continuum were composed of indivisibles that are successive, then these indivisi-
bles would follow one another in sequence with no additional indivisibles in
between (231b6-10). This means that there would be a unique first indivisible
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12 In the opening sentence of Physics vi 1, Aristotle claims that if the definitions of ‘continuous’,
‘contiguous’, and ‘successive’ in Physics v 3 are correct, then it is impossible for a continuum to con-
sist of indivisibles. This impossibility can only follow if the definitions in Physics v 3 exhaust the
field of possibilities of the ways in which the constituents of a continuum can be related.
that is distinct from and after each indivisible in the continuum. Yet, if a contin-
uum were composed of indivisibles that are contiguous with each other, then
these indivisibles would need to be in contact. But since indivisibles can only be
in contact whole to whole, then they would coincide and fail to be distinct
(231a29-b6). Since contradictions result from both of these disjuncts, and the dis-
junction exhausts the remaining possibilities for the ways in which components
of a continuum can be related, Aristotle concludes that a continuum cannot be
composed of indivisibles.
We can derive analogous absurdities from the assumption that the path of A’s
motion is composed of points: According to the argument of Physics vi 1, if the
path of A’s motion were composed of points, then these points would need to be
either contiguous with each other or successive. If the latter, then there would be
a unique first point after point B that is distinct from point B at which it is first
true to say that A has departed from point B. Since there is always a first instant
of having reached any point, there will be two distinct instants such that one will
be a unique first instant of having reached point B and the other will be a unique
first instant of having reached the first point after point B, and, therefore, a
unique first instant of having departed from point B. Yet, if the path of A’s
motion were composed of points that are contiguous with one another, then these
points would need to be in contact. But since points can only be in contact whole
to whole, then point B, and any point contiguous with it would coincide and fail
to be distinct. If A departs from point B by moving to a contiguous point, since
this point coincides with point B, A will both have come to be at point B and
have departed from point B at the same time. Thus, if the path of A’s motion
were divided into points, either there is a unique first instant of having departed
from point B, or A has come to be at point B and has departed from point B at the
same time.
Our initial interpretation of reductio (a), then, should be revised so that Aristo-
tle infers from the claim that (3) A is always coming to a stop when it is undergo-
ing locomotion, the disjunction that either (4) A has come to be at point B and
has departed from point B at the same time or (4.1) there is a first instant of hav-
ing left B. And since (4) directly entails the contradiction that A is both at B and
away from B at the same time, Aristotle can infer the truth of proposition (4.1) by
disjunctive syllogism. But, of course, proposition (4.1) is not true, in Aristotle’s
view. It is, however, a valid consequence of proposition (2), which is the target of
Aristotle’s reductio, and it is a proposition that contradicts proposition (2)
because it implies that A has rested at point B after all. The offending proposi-
tions (4) and (4.1) follow from proposition (2) because proposition (2) implies
that what we choose to call ‘one change’ is entirely arbitrary, and this implies
proposition (3), which, in turn, implies propositions (4) and (4.1). It is for this
reason that the argument can be taken as an attack on the Zenonian assumption
that what we choose to call ‘one change’ is entirely arbitrary.
A lot hinges, in this proof, on the assumption, implicit in Aristotle’s refutation
of the notion that a continuum can be composed of indivisibles in Physics vi 1,
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that if, per impossibile, a continuum were resolved into indivisibles, these indi-
visibles would need to be discretely ordered. This follows from the assumption
that there are only three ways in which the components of a continuum can be
related, each of which having the succession of the components built into their
definitions. But why should the possibilities for the ways in which points com-
posing a magnitude can be related be restricted to relations producing discrete
orders? If there is a ‘mistake’ in reductio (a), this is where it lies: Aristotle is will-
ing to grant, per impossibile, that a continuum may be divided into an infinitely
numerous point set, but he refuses or fails to countenance the idea that this point
set might be densely ordered. This is because, if every line is divisible into an
infinite, dense sequence of points, and every sub-segment of a line is likewise
divisible, then every point set constituting a line will have infinitely many sub-
sets, each having infinite cardinalities. But, as Sorabji 1983, 212 and 323 points
out,13 the following passage from Physics iii 5 evidently argues that this is inco-
herent:
It is plain, too, that the infinite cannot be an actual thing and a
substance and principle. For any part of it that is taken will be
infinite, if it has parts; for to be infinite and the infinite are the
same, if it is a substance and not predicated of a subject. Hence
it will be either indivisible or divisible into infinites. But the
same thing cannot be many infinites. (Yet just as part of air is
air, so a part of the infinite would be infinite, if it is supposed to
be a substance and principle.) Therefore the infinite must be
without parts and indivisible. But this cannot be true of what is
infinite in fulfillment; for it must be a definite quantity.
(204a20-29)
This highlights the fact, noted so often by commentators, that the distinction
between Aristotle’s concepts of continuous and discrete is not the same as ours.
Aristotle’s distinction is not a distinction between dense and discrete orders
respectively. It is a contrast between relations, both of which produce discrete
orders, but where the relata of one bears an additional metaphysical relation of
having unified limits.
Reductio (b)
As I said at the outset, the advertised purpose of Physics viii 8 is to prove, by
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13 Bostock 1988, 261 has objected to Sorabji’s interpretation of the passage just quoted, arguing
that in it, Aristotle seeks to rule out only infinitely extended substances with infinitely extended parts,
not infinite sets with infinite subsets. But even, so, there is evidence for a broad construal of the doc-
trine at Physics vi 7.238a9-11, since, there, he applies it to times. In this passage, the assumption that
infinite times cannot have infinite times as subsets seems to be required in Aristotle’s proof that a
finite distance cannot be traversed in an infinite time. Aristotle’s argument implies that if the whole of
a distance is traversed in an infinite time, no proper part of this distance can be traversed in an infinite
time. (Cf. White 1992, 63 and Ross 1923, 100, which argues that Aristotle takes division everywhere
to resolve a continuum into a finite number of points. I claim that he takes division everywhere to
resolve a continuum into an infinite number of points, each subset of which is finite.)
disjunctive syllogism, that only circular motion is infinitely continuous. Aristotle
does this by first assuming that there must be some motion that is infinitely con-
tinuous, and that there are only three types of motion, viz., circular, rectilinear,
and a mixture of rectilinear and circular (261b27-31). He then sets about elimi-
nating rectilinear motion as a possibility as follows, assuming that mixed rectilin-
ear and circular motion will be eliminated with it, because if either of the
unmixed motions are not continuous, then neither will any motion composed of
them: Presumably because of the finite size of the universe, if a given object G
undergoes rectilinear locomotion, then the locomotion that it undergoes is finite
(Simplicius argues for this as an implicit assumption at In Phys. 1278,15). So if
G’s locomotion is finite, sooner or later it must turn back in the direction from
whence it came. But if G turns back, then G has come to be at a limit of its
motion and has ceased to be at a limit of its motion, and if G has come to be at a
limit of its motion and has ceased to be at a limit of its motion (alternatively, if G
has used the limit both as the terminus ad quem of a prior motion and the termi-
nus a quo of a subsequent motion), then it must come to rest at this limit. If G
rests at a limit of its motion, however, then G’s motion is not continuous. So if a
given object G undergoes rectilinear locomotion, then its motion is not continu-
ous. Reductio (b) effects an indirect proof of the key premise that if G has come
to be at a limit of its motion and has ceased to be at a limit D of its motion, then it
must come to rest:
If G is undergoing locomotion towards D and then turns back
and undergoes locomotion downwards again, it has used the
extremity D as an end (b25) and a beginning—the one point as
two. This is why it must have stopped. It has not come to be at
D and departed from D at the same time, for in that case it
would simultaneously be and not be there at the same instant.
But in fact we must not apply the solution of the previous puz-
zle. We cannot say that G is at D at (b30) a cut of time, but that
it has not come to be or departed <from D>. For it must reach
an endpoint that exists actually, not potentially. Now although
the points in the middle exist potentially, this one does so actu-
ally; it is an end when considered from below (263a1) and a
beginning when considered from above. And therefore it is
related in the same way to the motions. Therefore a thing that
turns back on a straight line must stop. Therefore there cannot
be continuous eternal motion on a straight line. (262b23-
263a3)
Simplicius, In Phys. 1281,4ff. assumes that what is proved in this reductio is log-
ically entailed by the proposition proved in reductio (a) because he takes the
proposition proved in reductio (a) to be the following: For every point on the
path of A’s continuous locomotion, including its terminus a quo E and terminus
ad quem C, if A has come to be at this point and has ceased to be at this point,
then A rests at this point. A fairly obvious problem with this is that it makes
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reductio (b) otiose. If the proposition proved in reductio (a) directly entailed the
proposition proved in reductio (b), then there would be no reason to undertake
the latter reductio, because the proposition that it proves can be directly inferred
from the proposition proved in reductio (a). Nothing in the text, however,
requires Simplicius’ reading, and, in fact, it clashes with the way I have inter-
preted reductio (a). In reductio (a), the absurd result that either there is a first
instant of having left point B, or A has come to be at point B and has left point B
at the same time followed from the division of A’s motion at every point, and the
division of A’s motion at every point followed, in part, from the assumed homo-
geneity of A’s motion, which in reductio (a), forced us to conclude that if A
could come to be at and depart from point B without resting, it must do the same
at every point along its path. But the heterogeneity of G’s motion in the present
case forces no such conclusion upon us. Since the movements to point D and
from point D are motions of different species, we can adduce this feature of the
change as a reason for treating point D as a kinetic terminus while denying this
status to all of the other states that G passes through while approaching and
receding from point D.
In the light of this, I will instead take reductio (a) to prove a slightly different
proposition than what Simplicius suggests, viz., that for every point between, but
not including points E and C on the path of A’s continuous locomotion from
point E to point C, if A has come to be at this point and has ceased to be at this
point, then A rests at this point. On this view, the proposition proved in reductio
(a) does not directly entail the proposition proved in reductio (b). Rather, reduc-
tio (b) produces the same absurd result as reductio (a) because, once it is admit-
ted that G can arrive at and depart from the point of reversal D without stopping
as envisaged in reductio (b), it must also be admitted that A can arrive at and
depart from any other point without stopping as in reductio (a). In other words,
once we allow that this arriving and departing without resting can occur at the
end or beginning of a change, and given the premises of Zeno’s dichotomy para-
dox, there is no reason to deny, without being entirely arbitrary, that it can occur
in the course of a change as well. So though not explicitly stated, the same infi-
nite fracturing of motion that we found in reductio (a), and which ultimately fol-
lowed from the Zenonian assumption that what we choose to call ‘one change’ is
entirely arbitrary, is assumed in reductio (b), and, here, it produces the same
absurd results.
Thus, the structure of reductio (b) is closely analogous to the structure of
reductio (a), except that whereas object A moves continuously from point E to
point C along a spatial path containing the point B, object G moves continuously
to and from point D along a spatial path limited at one end by point D. And
whereas in reductio (a), Aristotle infers from the assumption (2) that A has come
to be at point B and has departed from point B without resting to the claim that A
is always coming to a stop when it is undergoing locomotion, in reductio (b)
Aristotle infers from the assumption (2) that G has come to be at point D and has
departed from point D without resting first that G can come to be at and depart
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from any point in its motion to and from D without resting, and then that (3) G is
always coming to a stop when it is undergoing locomotion. The rest of the argu-
ment is exactly analogous.
Reductio (c)
Another indirect proof, in which the infinite fracturing of change is implicit,
and which I also propose to read as an attack on Zeno’s assumption that what we
choose to call ‘one change’ is entirely arbitrary, is found in the following pas-
sage. I will call this ‘reductio (c)’:
If anything that is after previously not being, must come to be a
thing that is, and is not when it is coming to be, then the time
interval cannot be divided into indivisible times. For if D was
becoming pale at A, but it has simultaneously come to be and
is <pale> at another indivisible (b30) time, B, which is con-
tiguous <with A>—if at A it was coming to be <pale>, it was
not <pale>, and at B it is <pale>—then between <A and B>
there must be some process of coming to be, and consequently
(264a1) a time interval in which it was coming to be. The same
argument does not hold for those who deny that there are indi-
visibles. Instead, it has come to be and is <pale> at the last
point of the very time interval in which it was coming to be
<pale>, and nothing is contiguous with or successive to this,
whereas indivisible times are successive. (263b26-264a6)
This argument can be paraphrased as follows: If a time period A when D is
undergoing a process of coming to be pale were divisible into indivisible nows,14
then these nows would be successive.15 If the nows in time period A were succes-
sive, then there would be a last now in period A (call it n), in which it is not yet
pale, that is immediately succeeded by a first now B in which D is pale, B being
the instant at which the process of coming to be pale is completed. If the process
is completed at B, and D is not yet pale at n, then the process of coming to be
pale must have extended beyond n to B, but if this is so, then there must have
been a time interval between n and B, because, ex hypothesi, D was undergoing
a process of coming to be pale, and every part of a process is temporally
extended.16 So n and B are not successive after all and the time period when a
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14 Simplicius vacillates between interpreting A as a period composed of indivisibles (1297,22-
23) and an indivisible itself (1297,30). Philoponus, ad loc, recasts the problem, substituting indivisi-
bles A and B for A, and indivisible C for B, so that what Aristotle calls A is composed of A and B. At
any rate, Aristotle’s claim that D was coming to be (, imperfect tense, 263b28-29) pale in A,
in the light of his doctrine that there is no motion at an instant, would seem to require A to be a time
period.
15 Aristotle talks indifferently, in this passage, of nows being contiguous or successive, but he
seems to mean the technical sense of ‘successive’ throughout, since the puzzle assumes that ‘contigu-
ous’ times A and B are distinct. If A and B were ‘contiguous’ in the technical sense, then the last now
of A would not be distinct from B, and Aristotle’s conclusions would not follow.
16 Simplicius suggests a way of strengthening the argument by heading off various strategies of
process is occurring cannot be divided into indivisible nows. But if A is not com-
posed of indivisibles, then there is a first instant in which D is pale but no last
instant in which D is not pale, since the first moment of being pale limits the
period of coming to be pale and of being not-pale. Q.E.D.
I claimed that reductio (a) argued from the assumption that A can come to be at
point B and depart from point B without resting to the result that the path of A’s
locomotion is divided at every point, and, therefore, is divided into and com-
posed of points. Since the time of a motion is co-divided with the magnitude, we
can construct an analogous argument from the same assumption to the effect that
the time of A’s locomotion is divided at every now, and, therefore, is divided into
and composed of nows. In reductio (c), Aristotle leaves it to the reader to con-
struct this analogous argument about D, and proceeds directly to demonstrate the
absurdity of the notion that the time of a motion can be composed of nows. If the
time of a motion were composed of indivisible nows, Aristotle argues, these
nows would need to be successive, but if this were so, an absurdity would result.
Unlike reductio (a), however, in which the absurdity involved the existence of a
first instant away from a given state in a continuous change, in this argument the
absurdity involves the existence of a last instant away from a terminus ad quem.
Another feature of this argument that distinguishes it from reductios (a) and (b)
is that the change it describes is cast in terms of contradictories ( 
) rather than contraries. We know that contradictories like pale and
not-pale, and being and not-being (Phys. vi 10.241a29-30, Meta. 1008a8-9)
admit no tertium quid (Phys. v 3.227a9-10, Meta. 1011b23-24, 1057a34, 1069a3-
4), and it seems natural to suppose that, for this reason, a change between pale
and not-pale, and indeed any change between contradictories, will be instanta-
neous. Aristotle’s usual method of describing instantaneous change is to say that
something has come to be, or has come to be F without ever being in the process
of coming to be, or coming to be F.17 But reductio (c) explicitly envisages D
coming to be (, imperfect tense) pale over a period of time18 (263b26-27,
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escaping Aristotle’s conclusion that there must be a time interval between n and B: Instead of claim-
ing that n is succeeded by a first now B in which D is pale, B being the instant at which the process
of coming to be pale is completed, according to Simplicius, Aristotle should have said that n is suc-
ceeded by a now B in which D is already pale (In Phys. 1297,26-27; 1297,39-1298,3). Since, ex
hypothesi, D is undergoing a process of coming to be pale, then that process must be completed at B
or at some earlier time. If the process is completed at B, then Aristotle’s result follows. But with Sim-
plicius’ formulation, one could refute the suggestion that the process was completed at some earlier
time than B. If someone claims that the process was completed at the limit of n, then Aristotle could
reply that this is impossible because n has no limit. One could also refute the claim that the process
was completed at an earlier now than B (call it n-1), and that it was this now that was contiguous
with n, on the grounds that D would be pale at n-1 and not pale at n, and the same problem would
arise again.
17 Individual substantial forms are able to have come to be without ever coming to be, and the
same is true of surfaces, lines, contacts, changes, and states of the soul, as well as relations and part-
less things like points. See, e.g., Phys. vii 3.247b1-248a9, viii 6.258b17-18, Cael. 280b6-7, b15-16,
b21-23, b26-27, Meta. 1002a32-34, 1027a29-30, 1039b26, 1043b15-16, 1044b21, 28, 1088a34-35.
18 Thus, as Simplicius points out, the argument does not apply to things that are and are not with-
264a2-5), and adds that D is not-pale while it is coming to be pale (263b30). Now
if D is coming to be pale throughout A (i.e., D does not rest in any part of A), is
not-pale throughout A, and there is no tertium quid between being pale and being
not-pale, it is not immediately obvious what progression of states D is passing
through while in period A to justify saying that it was coming to be pale through-
out this time. That there must be such a progression of states follows from the
assumption that D is becoming pale throughout period A, so that it contains no
periods of rest, and from Aristotle’s definition of rest such that ‘a thing is at rest
if its condition in whole and in part is uniform now and before’ (Phys. vi
3.234b5-7).19 Moreover, since D is not at rest at any time during A, since Aristo-
tle defines rest as he does, and since reductio (c) proves that the nows within A
must be densely ordered rather than discretely ordered,20 then the progression of
states D is passing through during A must also be densely ordered, otherwise, A
will contain a period of rest.21
There are, I think, three possibilities for extricating Aristotle from this diffi-
culty: (1) The first is to suppose that while D is not-pale but coming to be pale,
some process is going on that, while not identical to the alteration, is causally
related to it in a way that would allow us to say D is coming to be pale because it
is going on. (2) The second is to suppose while D is not-pale but coming to be
pale, it is coming to be paler by degrees, passing through a dense sequence of
degrees of pallor.22 On this interpretation, ‘not-pale’ is just a name for any degree
of pallor that is not maximally pale. (3) The third option is to suppose that while
D is not-pale but coming to be pale, it is coming to be pale piecemeal. On this
interpretation, ‘not-pale’ is just a name for any state in which some portion of D
is not pale.23
Both Sorabji and Broadie choose option (1), but while Broadie tentatively sug-
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out coming to be or passing away (In Phys. 1297,20).
19 In other words, the mere passage of time cannot count as a ‘coming to be’.
20 By ‘densely ordered’ I mean, here, what White 1992, 22 calls ‘distributive density’: Indivisi-
bles, in the sense of actual divisions in a continuum, are densely ordered in this way if and only if for
any two actual divisions that one makes, it is always possible to make another actual division between
these two actual divisions in the continuum.
21 We can deduce this consequence as follows: If the instants in period A are densely ordered
and the series of states that D passes through are not, then between every two instants u and w there is
another instant v, but it is not the case that between every two incompatible states x and z, there is
another state y that is incompatible with both x and z, and, therefore, it is the case that there are at least
two incompatible states x and z that D passes through, between which there is no state y. Since states
x and y are incompatible, they must hold at different times u and w, but if this is the case, there is
some time v between u and w at which D must either be in state x or state z. If D is in state x, then D
was at rest between instant u and instant v. If D is in state z, then D was at rest between instant v and
instant w. Hence, if the instants in period of A are densely ordered and the series of states that D
passes through are not, then A will contain a period of rest.
22 See, e.g., Cat. 10b26-30: ‘Qualifications admit of a more and a less; for one thing is called
more pale or less pale than another, and more just than another. Moreover, it itself sustains increase
(for what is pale can still become paler)—not in all cases though, but in most.’ Cf. Phys. v 2.226b1-9.
23 This option is discussed at Phys. v 6.230b32-231a1, vi 4.234b10-20; vi 9.240a16-29; vi
10.240b21-31.
gests that the causally related process may be something like an external agent
preparing to paint D, Sorabji claims to find an example of such a process in De
sensu 6. Recognizing that this process needs to be continuous, Sorabji 1976,
172n23 focuses on how this might be the case while resulting in a discontinuous
switch to complete pallor from some shade of pallor that is discriminably differ-
ent from complete pallor. The answer, he claims, is Aristotle’s concept of non-
intrinsic continuity (  µ ’  ) mentioned at 445b28. A
change in color, or in this case, pallor, from one discriminable shade to the next
in a discontinuous sequence of discriminable shades, may be non-intrinsically
continuous, claims Sorabji 1983, 411, because it is ‘produced by a continuous
change in the proportions of earth, air, fire, and water in a body’. The idea, pre-
sumably, is that if D is, for instance, a bucket of paint that is one discriminable
shade away from being completely pale, by continuously varying the mixture of
pigments, a painter can cause the paint to alter to the next discriminable degree of
pallor, viz., complete pallor. Variations in pallor less than this increment ‘are not
perceptible except by being part of the whole variation (   ), by which
Aristotle probably means that they only contribute to the whole variation’
(446a18).
The main problem with this approach, as I see it, is that it makes reductio (c)
an argument about perceptible alteration rather than about alteration as such, and
Aristotle gives no indication that he intends such a restriction. In any event, inter-
pretative charity should prevent us from supposing that Aristotle believes, in gen-
eral, that perceptible change exhausts the field of change. We cannot, for
instance, infer from the fact that we cannot see the length of a shadow changing
over the course of a minute, that the length of the shadow is not changing during
that minute.24 Nor is there textual warrant to attribute to Aristotle the more
restricted assumption that perceptible alteration exhausts the field of alteration.
Certainly, colors like shades of pallor are defined by Aristotle as ‘perceptibles’,
but it follows from nothing Aristotle says that in order for a shade of pallor to be
perceptible, the difference between it and every other shade of pallor must also
be perceptible, which is what would be required for every change of pallor to be
a perceptible change of pallor. Part of Sorabji’s motivation, here, is to accommo-
date the fact that at 445b21-22, Aristotle says that ‘  of color, taste, sound,
and other perceptibles are limited’, which he takes to mean that the set of actually
discriminable shades of color is limited.25 But this does nothing to rule out the
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24 Moreover, Aristotle’s claim in Physics vi 6 that whatever has changed was changing earlier,
and whatever was changing earlier, had changed before that, ad infinitum, effectively commits him to
the existence of changes that are so small that they cannot actually be seen, even in principle.
25 Many commentators will want to rule out option (2) because they take 445b21-22 to amount
to the stronger claim that the set of perceptible shades of color is limited. Against this view, Murphy
2008, 194n18 has pointed out that   µ  are said to be only seven in number at De
sensu 442a19-25. Since this is an implausibly small number to be the perceptible shades of color or
even the discriminable shades of color, he concludes that by , Aristotle must mean a species of
color under which many shades fall. Still, many commentators will, no doubt, adduce Physics vi
5.236a36-b18 as independent evidence that the path of a qualitative change is not infinitely divisible.
possibility that while our painter is continuously varying the mixture of pigments
in D, and before D alters to the next actually discriminable shade, D is passing
through an infinite series of perceptible shades of pallor that differ by degrees
that are only potentially perceptible. This, however, is perfectly consistent with
option (2), and option (2) does not restrict the scope of reductio (c) to actually
perceptible alteration. 
The notion that there are very small potentially perceptible differences in mag-
nitude and quality, and, therefore, very small potentially perceptible changes
between both actually perceptible magnitudes and actually perceptible qualities,
can be found in De sensu 6: Aristotle says that though a ten-thousand part in a
grain of millet is too small to see by itself, it is nonetheless perceptible poten-
tially, and indirectly (µ ’ ) because the size of the whole grain of millet
that includes it is actually perceptible, otherwise we would have a perceptible
thing (the grain of millet) composed of imperceptibles, which is absurd. It fol-
lows from this that if a millet seed grew by a ten-thousandth part, the change in
size would be potentially perceptible, but not actually perceptible because the
increment of change would be potentially perceptible. Aristotle gives every indi-
cation that an analogous account applies to alteration, though his example, here,
is sound instead of color.26 Aristotle argues that though the sound in a quarter-
tone within a whole strain is too small to hear by itself, that sound is nonetheless
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But what this text actually says is that ‘that into which’ something alters, like pallor, is indivisible,
and that ‘only in qualitative change is there anything indivisible in its own right’. Murphy argues con-
vincingly, that ‘that into which’ something alters is the terminus ad quem of an alteration, and not the
path, but even if this were not conceded, the concluding sentence of this passage says only that only
qualitative changes have something indivisible in its own right, not that all and only qualitative
changes do. So the orthodoxy that Aristotle does not countenance continuous qualitative change
seems not to be justified by the passages usually adduced in its favor. Murphy, moreover, finds a pas-
sage in De sensu 3 that countenances an example very much like the one I propose for option (2), in
which a painter causes D to pass through an infinite series of perceptible shades of pallor by continu-
ously varying the mixture of pigments in D: ‘Colors will thus, too be many in number on account of
the fact that the ingredients may be combined with one another in a multitude of ratios’ (440b18-20).
Murphy points out that not only does Aristotle make the color of paint a function of the proportion of
the colors mixed, here, but he makes the explananda the many shades of color and the explanans the
many ratios of mixing. ‘If the same shade could be produced by many ratios’, argues Murphy 2008,
192-193, ‘then that there are many ratios need not entail that there are many shades. Thus, since there
are infinitely many (and indeed a dense ordering of) ratios of the form n:m, we should expect that
there is also a dense ordering of shades of color’.
26 E.g., after the initial passage from 445b4-20 that raises questions about the perceptibility of
very small magnitudes Aristotle says: ‘The solution of these questions will bring with it also the
answer to the question why the  of color, taste, sound, and other  are limited’ (445b20-
22). Then he introduces the distinction between the potentially and actually perceptible and gives two
examples that are clearly meant to be analogous, one involving magnitude and one involving quality:
‘It is owing to this difference [i.e., the difference between potential and actual perceptibility] that we
do not see its ten-thousandth part in a grain of millet, although sight has embraced the whole grain
within its scope; and it is owing to this, too, that the sound contained in a quarter-tone escapes notice,
and yet one hears the whole strain, inasmuch as it is a continuum; but the interval between the
extreme sounds escapes the ear’ (445b31-446a4). White 1992, 128-130 also points out that Aristotle
proposes an analogy between magnitude and quality in this passage rather than a contrast.
audible potentially, and indirectly (µ ’ ) because the whole strain that
includes it is actually audible, otherwise we would have an audible thing (the
whole strain) composed of things that are not audible, which is absurd. It follows
from this that if the pitch of a sound increased by a quarter-tone, the change in
pitch would be potentially audible, but not actually audible because the incre-
ment of change would be potentially audible. Aristotle even says that the whole
strain (not the lyre string, as in Sorabji’s version), like the magnitude, is continu-
ous (446a2), so that the point is to assimilate qualitative change to quantitative
change with respect to continuity, not to contrast them.
This certainly seems to leave the door open for continuous alteration, and
given the absence of any compelling reason to rule it out, and the fact that
Sorabji’s version of option (1) unduly restricts the scope of reductio (c), option
(2) seems to be preferable to option (1).27 But we have yet to consider option (3),
which supposes that while D is becoming pale from being not-pale, it is becom-
ing pale piecemeal, and is doing so continuously because its subject is infinitely
divisible. Sorabji rejects option (3) because Aristotle says that D is not-pale dur-
ing period A (263b30), and he thinks, presumably, that this is inconsistent with D
being partially pale. Sorabji takes this view, I assume, because if Aristotle had
meant that D was only partially pale in A, claiming that D was not-pale in A
would be a misleading way of expressing it. The same objection would appear to
apply to option (2), which assumes that D was becoming paler by degrees rather
than by parts throughout A. But this consideration alone is not persuasive enough
to prefer option (1) to either options (2) or (3), given the fact that De sensu 6
seems to support option (2) instead of option (1), and since there are many texts
that support option (3) (see Sorabji 1976, 172n23). It seems reasonable, then, to
suppose that Aristotle could have meant, in reductio (c), either that D is coming
to be completely pale by degrees throughout A as in option (2) or is coming to be
completely pale piecemeal throughout A as in option (3), and that when he
describes this as ‘coming to be pale from being not-pale’, he is choosing an
abstract way to describe one or another of these continuous changes.28
336
27 A final objection to option (2), due to Broadie 1982, 157, is easily dispensed with: Noting that,
in the immediately preceding section (263b9-26), Aristotle talks of D changing from pale to not-pale
as well as from not-pale to pale, Broadie objects that D’s change from pale to not-pale ‘cannot consist
in a graduated passage through shades between white and some final color. For the object cannot be
white and an intermediate color at the same time, whereas it is white and in process at the same time.
As soon as it comes to some shade S, however “close”, that we are willing to regard as distinct from
white, then at that moment we are bound to say that the process to not-white is over’. But when Aris-
totle says that the pale of D is perishing (imperfect) through the whole of A ( <> 
   , 263b22), there is no reason why we cannot imagine this as a process of coming to be
less and less pale since we know from Categories 10b26-30 that pallor comes in degrees. And some-
thing less pale is, nonetheless pale. As long as the transition to not-pale is preceded by a period in
which D is pale but becoming not-pale, D’s change can be recast as a continuous change.
28 There is, moreover, independent evidence that contradictory terms like ‘not-pale’ are sup-
posed to have precisely this abstractive function for Aristotle. In Prior Analytics i 46, Aristotle says
that each contradictory term ‘not-F’ ( F) has an instance of a privation that can also be denoted by
‘un-F’ (-F) underlying it (51b25-28). Since privations come in degrees, the function of the term
Reductio (d)
The fourth indirect proof that I will analyze, which I will call ‘reductio (d)’, is
found at 264b1-6. Like reductio (c), it is also cast in terms of the contradictories
‘pale’ and ‘not-pale’:
Further, the following argument is more proper <to the sub-
ject> than the previous ones. The not-pale has perished and has
become pale at the same time. Therefore, if the alteration to
pale and from pale is continuous and does not remain station-
ary for any time interval, (b5) the not-pale has perished and has
become pale and has become not pale at the same time. For the
time of the three will be the same. (264b1-6)
This passage is particularly compressed and requires significant filling out under
any interpretation. But it is clear, at any rate, that the argument is meant to repro-
duce the results of reductio (b) in the case of an alteration: Just as in reductio (b)
we have a reversal in the direction of a change without a pause, and just as in
reductio (b), the absurdity results that a thing has arrived at and has departed
from a particular state at the same time. I will argue that, given this similarity in
structure, it is not only reasonable but also fruitful to fill this argument out by
assuming that the same infinite fracturing of change found in reductio (a) and
implied in reductio (b) is also implied here, and that this infinite fracturing of
change ultimately stems from Zeno’s assumption that what we choose to call
‘one change’ is entirely arbitrary.
At first sight, though, one might think that the most natural way to read this
passage is to assume that it turns on the discontinuity of contradictory change,
and that no infinite fracturing of a continuous change is involved. Bostock in
Bostock and Waterfield 1996, 296, for instance, claims that Aristotle’s implied
conclusion that D—‘D’ is the name given to the moving thing in the immediately
preceding discussion (263b16)—rests for a time when it changes direction fol-
lows only if pale and not-pale are strict contradictories and that the change
between them is discontinuous, otherwise, instead of resting, D might be moving
through a tertium quid between the time when it has come to be pale from being
not-pale, and then has come to be not-pale again (i.e., the time period that must
exist due to the impossibility of D having come to be pale and having come to be
not-pale at the same time). But then Bostock complains that the argument, being
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‘not-F’ seems to be to refer indiscriminately to a range of instances of ‘un-F’, as Aristotle implies at
Physics i 4.188b3-6: ‘Pale () comes from not-pale ( )—and not from any not-pale
( ), but from dark or some intermediate ( µ   µ).’ Aristotle tells us else-
where that the other colors are µ dark and pale in the sense of being ‘mixtures’ of darkness and
pallor (‘Crimson, violet, leek-green, and deep blue, come between pale and black, and from these all
others are derived by mixture’, De sensu 442a23-25, cf. Cat. 12a17-19 and Meta. 1053b31). Since
dark is the privation of pale (Phys. iii 1. 201a5-6, Sens. 442a26), this ‘mixture’ of darkness with pal-
lor can only mean the deprivation of pallor. Since pallor comes in degrees (Cat. 10b26-30), the idea
seems to be that the visible spectrum reduces to a range of privations of pallor, with dark, as the com-
plete privation of pallor at one end, complete pallor at the other, and the other colors arrayed in
between as partial privations.
only about instantaneous change, ends up being more limited in its application
than reductio (b), and this is a problem, presumably, because Aristotle claimed
earlier, at 264a8, that the arguments from then on were supposed to be more
 and general than the arguments that went before. Bostock also com-
plains that the argument is, in any event, undermined by Aristotle’s arguments in
Physics vi 6 that all genuine changes are continuous, including even changes
between contradictories, since these arguments imply that every discontinuous
change between contradictories can be redescribed as a continuous change
between contraries (cf. Bostock 1995, 199, and Murphy 2008, 215). Obviously,
if the changes from not-pale to pale and then back to not-pale, as Bostock inter-
prets them, can be redescribed as continuous changes between contraries, then
Aristotle’s desired conclusion does not follow on the way Bostock interprets the
argument.
Now Bostock, it seems, must take the phrase ‘and does not remain stationary
for any time interval’ at 264b4 to be epexegetical in the sentence ‘the alteration
to pale and from pale is continuous and does not remain stationary for any time
interval’, in which case, ‘continuous’ just means that there is no period of rest
between when D comes to be pale from being not-pale and then comes to be not
pale again. But this phrase can also be taken as a genuine conjunction, so that the
medium in which the alteration takes place is supposed to be continuous. If we
consider Aristotle’s arguments in Physics vi 6 that all such alterations are contin-
uous, and the fact that we have just seen, only 27 lines earlier, a contradictory
change that probably is supposed to be redescribable as a continuous change
between contraries, then it seems at least textually plausible to take Aristotle’s
argument in this way. Moreover, if we take Aristotle’s argument in this way, then
it can be seen as generating the same absurdities associated with the infinite frac-
turing of change that arose in reductios (a) and (b) from Zeno’s assumption that
what we call ‘one change’ is entirely arbitrary.29 A benefit of reading reductio (d)
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29 The way that reductio (d) generates these absurdities, under the suggested interpretation, is as
follows: If, as in options (2) and (3) of interpreting reductio (c), we assume that when Aristotle says
‘pale’ he means ‘completely pale’ and that when he says ‘not-pale’ he means ‘not completely pale’
either in the sense of possessing some definite but unspecified degree of pallor that is not maximally
pale (option (2)) or having some definite but unspecified proportion of its surface that is not pale
(option (3)), reductio (d) can be recast as follows: Assume that (1) an object D undergoes a continu-
ous alteration to being completely pale from being not completely pale, and then to being not com-
pletely pale from being completely pale. Assume, for reductio ad absurdum, that (2) D has come to
be completely pale and has ceased to be completely pale, but does not rest while being completely
pale. From this, infer that D can come to be at and cease to be at any of the stages of its continuous
alteration to and from being completely pale without resting. From this, infer that (3) D is always
coming to a stop when it is undergoing alteration and from this infer that either (4) D has come to be
completely pale and not completely pale at the same time or (4.1) there is a first instant of having
ceased to be completely pale. From the impossibility of (4) D having come to be completely pale and
not completely pale at the same time infer by disjunctive syllogism that (4.1) there is a first instant of
having ceased to be completely pale, and infer directly [i.e., from the impossibility of (4)] that (5) D
has come to be completely pale and has ceased to be completely pale at different times. From this,
infer that (6) there is a time interval between when D has come to be completely pale and when D has
in this way is that it brings out an assumption that was merely in the background
of reductios (a) and (b), viz., that the infinite fracturing of change envisaged there
makes the departures as well as the arrivals from the intermediate points changes
in their own right. At Physics vi 10.240b34-241a1 Aristotle claims that a motion
consisting of µ is a motion consisting of arrivals. But if a locomotion is
composed of µ and the path of the locomotion is composed of discretely
ordered points, then it is also composed of departures, because the departure
from any given point will be identical to the arrival at the ‘next’ point, even if,
absurdly, the ‘next’ point is not distinct from the one it follows. So under one
description, a motion consisting of µ is a motion consisting of arrivals,
but under another description, it is a motion consisting of departures.30 In reduc-
tio (d), this fact is brought to the fore by the abstractive function of the term ‘not-
pale’. Whereas in reductio (b), G was said to have both departed from D and
undergone motion in a contrary direction, here, our object is merely said to have
become not completely pale from being completely pale, which would appear to
cast the departure from being completely pale as a motion with its own terminus
ad quem. Under normal circumstances, we would ignore this implication because
we assume that the real terminus ad quem cannot be simply a departure from
being completely pale, but some definite degree of darkness. But if the motion is
indeed composed of µ, then the implication is exactly right: The depar-
ture from being completely pale simply is the motion to the first state of being
not completely pale, and this departure is a distinct motion with its own terminus
ad quem.
Thus, the fact that D’s departure from being completely pale is a change in its
own right ultimately follows from the infinite fracturing of change implicit in
granting the possibility of treating any stage of a continuous change as a termi-
nus. But if D’s departure from being completely pale is a change in its own right,
then it follows directly from this that there is a first instant of being not com-
pletely pale. At Physics vi 5.235b30-236a7, Aristotle argues for the claim that
there is always a first instant in the terminus ad quem of a change, and at Physics
viii 8.263b9-26, for the corollary that the instant dividing a period of coming to
be F from the period of being F that follows it must be allocated to the period of
being F.31 Or rather, as Bostock 1995, 196 points out, at Physics vi 5.235b30-
236a7 Aristotle argues that ‘if there is a first time in which a thing has changed,
then that time must be an instant’. Bostock characterizes the antecedent, here, as
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ceased to be completely pale. From this, infer that (7) D rests while being completely pale, which
contradicts the initial assumption (2) that D does not rest while being completely pale. So infer the
negation of the initial assumption [i.e., (2)], viz., (8) if D has come to be completely pale and has
ceased to be completely pale, it rests while being completely pale. Q.E.D.
30 Cf. Broadie 1983, 134 and 143 that claims that Zeno argued for a reductive account of motion
similar to the modern at-at conception of motion insofar as Zeno and the proponents of the at-at con-
ception both reduce motion to a set of instantaneous parts.
31 Sorabji 1976, 172 and Broadie 1982, 155ff. point out that what is envisaged by Aristotle at
263b15-26 is a temporally extended process of coming to be not-pale. Sorabji cites 263b21-22, where
Aristotle says       <>     .
a perfectly reasonable, but by no means mandatory assumption if change is
thought to proceed from some terminus a quo to some terminus ad quem in a
period of time.
Broadie 1983, 137-139, however, argues that the antecedent is mandatory, and,
indeed, follows from Aristotle’s definition of change in Physics iii 1. Since Aris-
totle defines change in terms of a single potentiality for a single as-yet non-actual
actuality, as an incomplete actuality to realize some terminus, and as something
that has the ‘directional form’ of an ‘F-wardness’ throughout, then the logic of
‘completion’ requires the end of the change, when the terminus is reached, when
the moving thing ‘has become F’ and ‘is F’, to be punctual, and the first such
time at which the moving thing is F.32 This is confirmed by Aristotle’s claim at
Physics vi 5.236a7ff. (cf. 241b2ff.), that a first instant of being in the terminus ad
quem ‘exists and is real’ because ‘it is possible for change to be completed and
there is an end to change’.
Reductio (a) Again
With this insight in hand, we can now shed new light on reductio (a). Aristotle
says in Physics vi 6.237a18-19 that whatever has changed was changing earlier,
and whatever was changing earlier, had changed before that, ad infinitum, so that
every changing object has completed an infinite number of changes. Aristotle
says at Physics vi 5.235b6ff. that either changing and departing and having
moved and having departed are identical or the latter of each pair ‘follows’ the
former. So every period of moving is also a period of departing and every instant
of having moved is also an instant of having departed. From this we can deduce
that whatever has departed was departing earlier, and whatever was departing
earlier, had departed before that, ad infinitum, so that every departing object has
completed an infinite number of departures. Aristotle also says, in his response to
Zeno at Physics viii 8.263b6-9, that it is possible to have traversed an infinite
number of half-distances accidentally,33 since it is an accidental property of a
magnitude to be an infinite number of half-distances.34 Hence, an object A that
has moved to point C from point B, as in reductio (a), has completed an infinite
number of departures from point B accidentally. So if it can be assumed (as Aris-
totle clearly wishes to assume) that A is moving to point C and from point B
throughout its transit from point B to point C, then each of these instances of hav-
ing departed point B (i.e., having ceased to be at point B and having come to be
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32 Cf. Broadie 1983, 155 that argues that coming to be is logically over at the moment at which it
has become and, therefore, is what it was coming to be.
33 There is controversy whether this is a potential or actual infinity. Sorabji 1987, 170 thinks that
this is an unwelcome implication for Aristotle. Alexander thinks it is a potential infinity and that the
word ‘potential’ must be supplied (ad loc apud Simplicium, In Phys. 1291,35ff.). Simplicius suggests
that, instead of carelessly omitting the word ‘potential’, Aristotle is using a new sense of the word
‘accidental’, which is equivalent to ‘potential’ (In Phys. 1292,35).
34 Analogously, Simplicius argues at In Phys. 1282,30-1283,5 that a moving thing is incidentally
at all of the intermediate points because being F at an instant is incidental to being F over a period.
not at point B) are accidental consequences of having moved to point C. But if
one denies the existence of a unified motion from point B to point C, there is
nothing of which any of these instances of having departed from point B are an
accidental consequence. So if, A departs from point B, as it surely must if it con-
tinues to move, then its departure must be a motion in its own right, and if the
departure from point B is a motion in its own right, it must conform to the defini-
tion of motion in Physics iii 1-2.
In summary, a local motion has the accidental description of being a sequence
of arrivals and departures.35 Physics v 2 defines an accidental change as a change
that is dependent upon another change for its existence, e.g., relational change
and change in action and passion are accidental because they depend upon the
occurrence of a change with respect to some other category. On this account,
departing from the terminus a quo is an accidental change because it depends for
its existence on the existence of some temporally extended change from some
terminus a quo to some terminus ad quem. The absurdities in reductios (a)-(d)
arise from treating this as an essential description. Who would treat a sequence of
arrivals and departures as an essential description of local motion? Anyone who
assumes that what we count as ‘one change’ when we are talking about a tempo-
rally extended occurrence is entirely arbitrary, viz., Zeno. This, finally, brings us
to reductio (e) and Aristotle’s only explicit discussion, in Physics viii 8, of crite-
ria of unity for changes.
Reductio (e)
Reductio (e) is at 264a9-21, and it eliminates, like reductio (b), the possibility
that there could be an infinitely continuous back and forth rectilinear motion,
and, therefore, serves the same purpose as reductio (b) in the overarching proof
of the chapter, by disjunctive syllogism, that only circular motion can be
infinitely continuous. What is significant about reductio (e), though, is that it
does this by an entirely different line of argument that involves no infinite frac-
turing of motion, and, therefore, seems to have nothing to do with Zeno’s
dichotomy paradox, and it invokes criteria for the unity of change, which is
something that reductios (a)-(d) do not do.
Although reductio (e) itself is found about two thirds of the way through chap-
ter 8, we find Aristotle setting the stage for it early on, at 261b31-262a12. Imme-
diately after he sets up the disjunctive syllogism at the beginning of chapter 8
(261b27-31), Aristotle argues as follows: Presumably because of the finite size of
the universe, if a given object A undergoes rectilinear locomotion, then the loco-
motion that it undergoes is finite. If A’s locomotion is finite, sooner or later it
must turn back in the direction from whence it came. But if A turns back, then A
undergoes motions that are contrary, and therefore diverse in species. But, Aris-
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35 Cf. Broadie 1983, 143, where she claims that, according to Aristotle, motion over a period
cannot be reduced to a series of arrivals and departures because ‘arrival’ cannot be understood with-
out reference to a temporally extended motion.
totle points out, he has previously established that motions that are diverse in
species cannot be one. So A’s motion is not one. But then, instead of drawing the
conclusion that since A’s motion is not one, it cannot be continuous, Aristotle
offers a consideration why A’s motions to and from a point of reversal must be
contrary, viz., they would arrest each other if they were simultaneous. Then he
breaks off this line of argument entirely and proceeds to set up reductio (a), not
returning to reductio (e) until much later in the chapter, when he writes:
Everything that is in motion (a10) continuously and arrives at a
certain thing in its locomotion, if it is not knocked out of its
way by anything, was also undergoing locomotion to that thing
before. For example, if it arrived at B, it was also undergoing
locomotion to B—not <only> when it was near, but right from
when it started its motion. For why now rather than earlier?
And likewise for the other <kinds of motion>. So, then, when a
thing that (a15) is in locomotion from A reaches C, it will
come back to A, being in motion continuously. Therefore,
when it is in locomotion from A towards C, it is then also in
locomotion to A in respect of its motion from C, and so <it is
undergoing> contrary <locomotions> at the same time. For the
rectilinear <locomotions> are contrary. And at the same time it
is changing from something in which it is not. Therefore, if this
is impossible it must (a20) come to a stop at C. Therefore the
motion is not single, for motion that is interrupted by a station-
ary state is not single. (264a9-21)
Reductio (e), in effect, finishes the line of argument just outlined by establishing
that A’s motion, since it is diverse in species, is not continuous. The argument
may be summarized as follows: Suppose some motion is diverse in species, yet
continuous, e.g., suppose A moves continuously to point C and turns back with-
out resting. In this case, the limit of the motion to point C is identical to the limit
of the motion from point C, so the two changes are continuous and, therefore,
one. But a change has its goal from its inception, so one change will at once be
directed to point C and from point C, which is impossible. So a motion cannot be
diverse in species, and at the same time, continuous. So if A undergoes a motion
that is diverse in species, then A’s motion is not continuous.
We can discern, in the foregoing, two criteria for the unity of change at work,
both of which can be found in Physics v 4. In the passage where Aristotle is set-
ting the stage for reductio (e) (261b31-262a12), we have the familiar criteria of
Physics v 4, viz., an occurrence that is ‘one change’ must be in a continuous time,
have a single subject throughout, and proceed throughout from a terminus of the
same species to a contrary terminus of the same species (cf. v 4.227b3-228a19).
In reductio (e) itself, however, another criterion of unity is implicit that is also
found in Physics v 4, viz., an occurrence is ‘one change’ if and only if it is con-
tinuous (   µ    ,   ,
  , µ, 228a20-22). At 228a23-24, Aristotle says that two change
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parts are continuous with each other if and only if their limits are one. From this
we can infer that a change is continuous if and only if the limits of any two parts
into which it is divisible are one (Bostock 1995, 183 makes this inference), and
we must assume this is the case if and only if the change is in a continuous time
and in a continuous medium, and is undergone by a single subject throughout.
Now these criteria overlap to the extent that they both require a continuous time
and the same subject throughout, but they differ insofar as one of them requires
uniformity of direction throughout the change, and the other requires a continu-
ous medium. I will call the former a teleological criterion of unity, in that it
requires that the change have one direction throughout.36 I will call the latter a
topological criterion of unity because it requires that the change have no gaps in
it. What reductio (e) does, in effect, is to prove that these teleological and topo-
logical criteria of unity for motions, when deployed together, make it impossible
for reversed rectilinear motion to be continuous. If the limits of two contrary
motions are ‘one’, and the motions are, therefore, ‘one’ according to the topolog-
ical criterion, this will create a motion that fails the teleological criterion by being
a motion that, absurdly, tends in two directions at once.
Conclusion
Of course, none of this should impress Zeno, or anyone else who refuses to
accept Aristotle’s definition of ‘one change’. And as Michael White, points out,
none of this prevents ‘one change’ from having parts that are also ‘one change’
where the parts are all of the same species. According to White, this is the func-
tion of reductio (a), which achieves this by implying that, in addition to the teleo-
logical and topological criteria just mentioned, an occurrence that is ‘one change’
must be bracketed by periods of rest and contain no periods of rest. While it can,
of course, be claimed that the result of reductio (a) is a new condition for a
change being ‘one change’, reductio (a), as well as reductios (b)-(d) can equally,
and perhaps more plausibly be seen as refutations of the assumption, implicit in
Zeno’s dichotomy paradox, that what one chooses to call ‘one change’ is entirely
arbitrary. I say ‘more plausibly’ because the textual evidence for attributing the
former intention to Aristotle in Physics viii 8 is weak. The only mention of crite-
ria of unity in Physics viii 8 occurs 12 lines before reductio (a), but, as we just
saw, the criteria, there, are invoked within an argument that has nothing to do
with the infinite fracturing of change. And indeed, the criteria stated in these
lines could not rule out ‘one change’ having parts that are also ‘one change’
because they are the weaker criteria of Physics v 4. Now White’s position would
presumably be that reductio (a) is adding a new condition to the list just cited
from Physics v 4, but if this were what Aristotle took himself to be doing here, it
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36 At Physics viii 8.261b34-262a6 Aristotle gives an example of what he means by ‘one in
species’: Since contrary motions, such as upward and downward locomotion are motions of different
species (262a6), if a motion consisted of parts that are contrary motions, it would fail to be unified. So
in the case of locomotion, every part of a motion must have the same direction, all are upward, or all
are downward etc.
is certainly odd that he does not say so, especially if the addition were motivated
by a realization of the inadequacy of the criteria set forth just a few lines earlier.
Although the implicit effect of reductio (a) may be to add a new condition to this
list, Aristotle certainly does not advertise this as his intention. 
At any rate, Aristotle seems to have already settled, in Physics vii 1, upon an
entirely different way to strengthen his definition of ‘one change’ in order to
head off the possibility that ‘one change’ could have parts that are also ‘one
change’. At 242b31-42, Aristotle purports to summarize the necessary and suffi-
cient conditions for a change to be one in Physics v 4, but states things in a
slightly different way: A change is numerically one if and only if it proceeds
from something numerically one and the same to something numerically one and
the same in a period of time that is numerically one and the same. ‘Numerically
one and the same time’ seems to mean, a ‘continuous time’ as in Physics v 4, but
as for the rest, the idea seems to be that the moving thing is moving from one ter-
minus a quo to one terminus ad quem and that each remains the same throughout
the change. Thus, Physics vii 1 strengthens the teleological criterion by adding
the requirement that at every stage of a unified change, not only is the mover
moving in the same direction throughout the change, but it is also moving to and
from a single pair of termini that remain the same throughout the change. What
this does, essentially, is to ensure that any change satisfying the definition of ‘one
change’ does not have parts that also satisfy the definition of ‘one change’, since
if it did, it would be moving to and from termini that are not one and the same
throughout.37 I say that Aristotle already settled, in Physics viii 8, upon an
entirely different way to strengthen his definition of ‘one change’, because
Physics vii has been thought to have been written after Physics v and vi but
before Physics viii,38 and, indeed, has been taken as an earlier draft of Physics
viii.39 This, however, raises the question of why, if an appropriately strengthened
criterion of unity has already been formulated in Physics vii 1, is it the unrevised
criteria that appear in Physics viii 8? A clue, I think, lies in the odd structure of
the text of Physics viii 7 and 8: The end of Physics viii 7, from 261a31 on, forms
a summary of conclusions to follow, but only some of them. At 261b3-7 we get a
preview of reductio (e), but no mention is made of reductios (a)-(d). Then, in
chapter 8, where these proofs are laid out, Aristotle first starts laying the ground
work for reductio (e) (261b31-262a17), but breaks off to pursue, in reductios (a)
and (b), an alternate route to the conclusion that reductio (e) is supposed to prove
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37 Broadie 1982, 152 shows that it is a relatively trivial matter to demonstrate, with this new cri-
terion, that ‘one motion’ cannot have parts that are also ‘one motion’. (Though Broadie mistakenly
reads this strengthened criterion into Physics v 4.227b20-9. See n3 above.)
38 Ross 1936, 16 dates Physics vii after both Physics v and vi; after Physics v because of the ref-
erences at 242b8 and b41-42 to Physics v 4 and 247b13 to Physics v 2, and after Physics vi because of
the reference in the  text at 242a6 to Physics vi 10. There seem, however, to be no backward refer-
ences in Physics viii to Physics vii. Ross follows Jaeger in taking Physics vii to be an earlier work
than Physics viii. 
39 E.g., Simplicius, In Phys. 1036,3ff. seems to take Physics vii to be an earlier draft of Physics
viii, the latter taking up the main points of the former and treating them in a more exact fashion.
(viz., that a reversal in the direction of a rectilinear locomotion requires the mov-
ing thing to come to rest), and then digresses on Zeno’s dichotomy paradox
(263a4-b8) before he finally gets around to finishing reductio (e) two thirds of
the way through the chapter. The fact that the summary of arguments at the end
of chapter 7 has no mention of reductio (b), the fact that reductios (b) and (e)
prove the same result, and therefore play the same logical role in proving that
only circular motion is infinitely continuous, and the fact that Aristotle starts with
reductio (e) but then breaks off to pursue reductio (b) and a digression on Zeno’s
dichotomy paradox, would seem to suggest that reductio (e) is part of an earlier
line of argument for the claim that only circular motion is infinitely continuous,
and that reductios (a) through (d) and the return to Zeno at 263a4-b8 is, as Ross
would say, an excrescence on the original plan of Physics viii 8, a digression that
has an attack on Zeno as its purpose, rather than building and defending an Aris-
totelian theory of change.
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